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Author: James Swenson, Managing Director, Ethixbase360
On November 10, 2025, Comunicaciones Celulares S.A. (“Comcel”), a subsidiary of Millicom International Cellular, entered into a two-year deferred prosecution agreement with the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”), to resolve a long-running criminal investigation under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). As part of the resolution, Comcel agreed to pay a $60 million fine and forfeit approximately $58.2 million in profits, resulting in a total penalty of roughly $118 million.
The DOJ’s filings describe a “widespread and systematic” bribery scheme spanning several years, in which Comcel executives and employees made substantial cash payments to Guatemalan government officials and members of Congress to influence legislation benefiting the company. The scheme allegedly relied on falsified contracts, fraudulent invoices, and shell entities to conceal payments.
The case is notable as the first corporate FCPA resolution since the DOJ ended its enforcement “pause” and issued new guidelines in June 2025, reflecting a recalibrated approach to corporate white-collar enforcement. The revised posture emphasizes accountability for serious bribery schemes involving high-value payments, concealment, or potential connections to broader criminal activity, while signaling reduced attention to low-value or routine “courtesies.”
Self-Disclosure, Joint Venture Dynamics, and Resolution Terms
In 2015, Millicom first discovered potentially problematic conduct and voluntarily disclosed it to the DOJ. At the time, Comcel was operated as a joint venture under the TIGO Guatemala brand. Millicom held a 55 percent stake but did not control day-to-day operations. The minority partner controlled key aspects of the business and limited Millicom’s access to information, complicating oversight and investigative efforts.
Millicom obtained operational control in 2021, prompting the DOJ to reopen its investigation. According to public statements, Comcel cooperated extensively thereafter. Millicom was not charged but agreed to ongoing reporting and compliance commitments. In its public communication, Millicom reported that Comcel received “a 50 percent discount off the bottom end of the applicable penalty range” based on cooperation and remediation.
The case highlights both the value and practical challenges of self-disclosure in complex ownership structures where visibility and access to information are limited.
DOJ’s Updated Enforcement Priorities
Recent remarks by senior DOJ officials, including Deputy Attorney General Todd Blanche, indicate that the FCPA remains a central enforcement priority, though within a more targeted framework. Key themes include:
- Prioritization of serious misconduct: Focus on high-value bribery, sophisticated concealment, and conduct that affects institutions, markets, or national security.
- Higher evidentiary bar: Preference for strong evidence of intent and individual culpability, rather than broad theories of corporate knowledge.
- Organized-crime linkages: Elevated interest in schemes tied to illicit financial networks; in this case, funds allegedly traced to narcotics proceeds.
- Streamlined enforcement: Preference for faster investigations and proportionate resolutions, with reduced reliance on monitorships.
Together, these shifts point to fewer but more consequential cases centered on significant harm and strong evidence. Several observations emerge from the resolution and the DOJ’s updated posture:
- Corporate liability is increasingly tied to demonstrable harm and individual accountability. Enforcement outcomes appear to hinge on traceable decision-making, evidentiary clarity, and documented involvement by culpable individuals.
- Complex ownership and control structures can magnify exposure. Joint ventures and minority-controlled arrangements may limit visibility and delay detection, even where parent companies intend to self-disclose or remediate.
- Timing of self-disclosure and access to information can materially influence outcomes. Early disclosure did not immediately lead to resolution here; cooperation became meaningful only once operational control shifted.
- Financial flows, intermediaries, and third-party actors remain central to risk. The use of shell companies, falsified documentation, and intermediaries continues to characterize large-scale bribery schemes.
- Geopolitical and criminal-economy linkages can elevate enforcement interest. Even absent corporate knowledge, proximity to illicit funds may influence charging decisions and settlement terms.
These dynamics underscore a shift toward enforcement focused on systemic, structured, and consequential misconduct.
Implications for Risk Assessments and Third-Party Risk Management
The Comcel resolution reinforces that corruption risk is often concentrated in the interfaces between a multinational and its operating environment — particularly where visibility is limited. While the enforcement action centres on historic conduct, the structural issues it exposes are highly relevant to today’s risk practitioners.
For organizations operating across complex markets or through joint ventures, the case underscores the need to:
- Assess effective control, not just ownership. Risk assessments should capture situations where governance authority, access to information, or financial oversight is limited, even when the parent holds a majority stake.
- Treat joint ventures and minority-controlled arrangements as inherently higher-risk. These structures frequently dilute or delay the detection of improper conduct, limiting the company’s ability to investigate, escalate, or self-disclose in a timely manner.
- Map transactional touchpoints vulnerable to concealment. Payments routed through advisory contracts, marketing funds, or intermediaries — particularly where documentation is inconsistent with the third party’s profile — should be prioritised for enhanced scrutiny.
- Integrate financial-flow risk indicators. Cash-heavy arrangements, offshore routing, and unexplained pass-through payments should influence not only risk scoring but also the decision to escalate to enhanced due diligence.
These elements highlight that modern bribery schemes rarely rely on a single bad actor; rather, they emerge from structural weaknesses, limited transparency, and the misuse of third parties. Incorporating these factors into risk assessments enables organizations to focus due diligence resources on the relationships and transactions most likely to expose them to regulatory and reputational harm.
Conclusion
Although much has already been written about the Comcel resolution, its relevance for compliance and risk teams goes beyond the headline penalty figures. The case speaks directly to ongoing challenges around visibility, third-party governance, and the practical realities of conducting effective due diligence in jurisdictions where information is limited or controlled by local partners. These themes will continue to shape DOJ expectations — and corporate risk programs — long after the news cycle moves on.
