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Author – James Swenson, Managing Director, Ethixbase360
Following the early January 2026 capture of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, the US and Venezuelan governments have been taking steps to encourage new investment. On January 9, President Donald Trump issued Executive Order 14373, Safeguarding Venezuelan Oil Revenue for the Good of the American and Venezuelan People, which according to a White House fact sheet, shields “Venezuelan oil revenue held in US Treasury accounts from attachment or judicial process.” On January 29, the Venezuelan government enacted the Law Amending the Organic Hydrocarbons Law, which allows for private sector participation in the oil sector, as well as changes the country’s tax and dispute resolution regimes.
Meanwhile, the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has also been busy. OFAC issued General License 46, authorizing a wide range of previously sanctioned transactions involving Venezuelan oil on January 29. This was followed by General License 47 on February 3, “Authorizing the Sale of U.S.-Origin Diluents to Venezuela”; guidance on February 6 for companies seeking to re-engage in Venezuela; and then on February 10, General License 48, “Authorizing the Supply of Certain Items and Services to Venezuela,” General License 46A, amending and clarifying General License 46 and General License 30, “Authorizing Certain Transactions Necessary to Port and Airport Operations.”
Amid this regulatory push, US Secretary of Energy Chris Wright traveled to Venezuela on February 11-12 to meet with Interim President Delcy Rodríguez. In published remarks, Wright said that the US government “has been working seven days a week to issue licenses, so existing businesses in Venezuela, new businesses that want to enter Venezuela, Venezuelan national companies can buy products, invest money, raise oil production, create new jobs, grow export revenue.” However, Reuters reported, Wright conceded, “There is no deadline for lifting all sanctions on Venezuela,” and that the deals needed to compensate companies after previous expropriations will not happen “overnight.”
In fact, legal experts note, while the new general licenses permit re-engagement, OFAC has maintained tight control, including strict reporting requirements, exclusion of any firms or persons tied to Russia, Iran, North Korea, or Cuba, and a requirement that contracts be under US law. Most payments, including to any entity of sanctioned, state-owned Petróleos de Venezuela, must be made into the Foreign Government Deposit Fund, defined in EO 14373. Moreover, a great deal of political and economic uncertainty remains, and the country’s own legal framework will certainly continue to evolve.
Additionally, the fallout of previous sanctions lingers, specifically with respect to the sale of PDV holdings, a subsidiary of Petróleos de Venezuela, and the owner of US-based refiner Citgo. While in November 2025, a judge ordered the sale of PDV Holdings to Amber Energy, it was reported that parties representing Venezuela appealed the sale – even after the leadership transition. Then on February 2, OFAC issued General License 5U, delaying the transaction.
The Venezuela situation should serve as a caution for investors or companies who seek to re-enter any country that has faced a sanctions regime and subsequently experiences political change. These considerations will apply all the more should – depending on the outcome of current events – it eventually proves possible to resume doing business with or in Iran. In sum, how should companies evaluate the risks of doing business in such markets?
Any firm looking at entering or re-engaging should recognize that mitigation begins with an awareness of the legal, geopolitical and reputational risks, and an understanding that such risks can persist despite a change in regime. Companies should tap into local expertise to review the legal framework and operating environment, and learn who is who in the business community. This includes knowing the private interests of current and former government officials, and considering how criminal groups have operated. Finally, firms should be aware that instability in one country in a high-risk geography could easily spill over across regional supply chains.
Companies must demonstrate alignment with international and their own internal standards, including a robust compliance regime, document controls, staff training, education and evaluation, and more. Particularly thorough due diligence of any third parties is warranted to ensure that business partners are reliable counterparties, including vetting connections to state-owned entities or any formerly sanctioned companies. Smaller to medium-sized firms that lack sufficient due diligence resources should take particular care to ensure that their risk mitigation is on solid footing.
Large multinationals might also consider ring-fencing their operations in such countries to build a compliance architecture that can withstand “snap-back” sanctions or further instability. Major companies can leverage their institutional weight and reputations to negotiate protections in their contracts, such as international arbitration stipulation, freezing clauses or economic equilibrium clauses, exit triggers, and transparency protocols that align with ESG standards.